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Abstract	
The Turkey-Russia-EU energy triangle is a relationship of interdependence and strategic compromise.  
However, Russian support for secessionism and erosion of state autonomy in the Caucasus and Eurasia 
has proven difficult to reconcile for western European states despite their energy dependence.  Yet, 
Turkey has enjoyed an enhanced bilateral relationship with Russia, augmenting its position and 
relevance in a strategic energy relationship with the EU.  The relationship between Ankara and Moscow 
is principally based on energy security and domestic business interests, and has largely remained stable 
in times of regional turmoil. This paper analyses the dynamics of Ankara-Moscow cooperation in order 
to understand which of the three scenarios in EU-Turkey relations - conflict, cooperation or 
convergence - could be expected to develop bearing in mind that the partnership between Turkey and 
Russia has become unpredictable. The intimacy of Turkish-Russia energy relations and EU-Russian 
regional antagonism makes transactional cooperation on energy demand the most likely of future 
scenarios. A scenario in which both Brussels and Ankara will try to coordinate their relations with 
Russia through a positive agenda, in order to exploit the interdependence emerging within the 
“triangle”. 
Özet	
Türkiye Rusya ve AB arasındaki enerji üçgeni bir karşılıklı bağımlılık ve stratejik uzlaşma ilişkisidir. 
Ancak, her ne kadar Rusya’ya enerji bağımlılıkları olsa da, Batı Avrupalı devletler için Rusya’nın 
Kafkasya ve Avrasyadaki ayrılıkçılığa ve devlet özerkliğinin erozyonuna verdiği desteğin 
kabullenilmesinin zor olduğu ortaya çıkmıştır.  Bu arada, Türkiye Rusya ile güçlendirilmiş ikili ilişkileri 
sürdürürken, AB ile stratejik enerji ilişkisindeki konumunu ve alakasını artırmaktadır. Ankara ve 
Moskova arasındaki ilişki esasen enerji güvenliği ve yurtiçi ticari çıkarlara dayanmakta olup; bölgesel 
karışıklık zamanlarında büyük ölçüde istikrarlı bir seyir izlemiştir. Bu çalışma, Türkiye ve Rusya 
arasındaki ortaklığın öngörülemez hale geldiğini akılda tutarak; Ankara-Moskova işbirliğinin 
dinamiklerini, AB-Türkiye ilişkilerindeki üç senaryodan -çatışma, işbirliği ya da yakınlaşma- hangisinin 
gerçekleşmesinin beklenebileceğini anlamak için analiz etmektedir. Türkiye-Rusya enerji ilişkilerinin 
yakınlığı ve AB-Rusya bölgesel zıtlaşması enerji talebine ilişkin alışveriş çıkarına dayalı işbirliğini gelecek 
senaryoları arasındaki en olası senaryo yapmaktadır. Bu senaryoda; Brüksel ve Ankara bu “üçgen” 
içinde ortaya çıkan karşılıklı bağımlılığı kendi çıkarları için kullanırken, Rusya ile ilişkilerini pozitif bir 
gündeme dayalı olarak koordine etmeye calışacaklardır. 
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1. Introduction		
Russia has, for several decades now, been the leading oil, gas and coal supplier to Turkey and the 
EU. Both, indeed, are natural destinations for Russian energy resources, as demonstrated by the 
strong (and growing) energy interdependence between them and Moscow. This situation is 
further reinforced by the quite limited opportunities for diversification for both Turkey and the EU 
(on the supply side) as well as for Russia (on the demand side), in the light of which current energy 
relations seem expected to continue with only minor deviations. Yet, fluctuating bilateral relations 
between Turkey and Russia on the one side and unresolved territorial conflicts and political 
tensions between the EU and Russia on the other might modify some of the current patterns. This 
would challenge the Ankara-Moscow partnership, which, for its part, could impact on the 
development of EU-Turkey relations in the energy field. 
Thus, the question is how Turkey-Russia energy dynamics do, or will, affect Ankara-Brussels 
relations more broadly - in particular, which of the three scenarios in EU-Turkey relations - conflict, 
cooperation or convergence - could be expected to develop bearing in mind that the partnership 
between Turkey and Russia has become unpredictable? The convergence scenario in EU-Turkey 
relations foresees a genuine revitalization of Turkey’s accession process as a consequence of 
Ankara’s full coordination of its energy policy with that of the EU. The cooperation scenario 
instead assumes that the EU and Turkey could promote their energy interests and projects without 
deepening their political and strategic dialogue. The conflict scenario would mean confrontation 
between the EU and Turkey, which would then also undermine their partnership in the energy 
field. 
In order to understand how Turkey-Russia relations affect those between Turkey and the EU, the 
paper will analyse focal issues and key drivers in the energy “triangle” comprising Turkey, Russia 
and the EU. Such issues could include the growing importance of Russia for Turkey’s energy 
sectors; Turkey-Russia bilateral relations, and the impact of existing and new political/security 
challenges (i.e. tensions over the Russian warplane incident in Syria); territorial conflicts in the 
Black Sea region, e.g. those involving Ukraine and Georgia; and the evolution of “pipeline politics” 
between Turkey, Russia and the EU - i.e. the destinies of TurkStream and the Southern Gas 
Corridor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Online Paper No. 5 “The Moscow-Ankara Energy Axis and the Future of             
EU-Turkey Relations” 
 
 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and         innovation 
programme under grant agreement No 692976. 
 
2 
2. Turkey-Russia	relations	within	the	bilateral	and	regional	context	
The Turkey-Russia-EU energy triangle has always been determined by the bilateral relationship 
between Ankara and Moscow. Even if these two disagree on a number of issues of geopolitical 
importance (wars in Ukraine and Syria, territorial conflicts in the Black Sea region, Iran, etc.), they 
have agreed to develop their partnership around trade and economy with a focus on energy. 
Energy security has long been a vital priority in Ankara’s foreign-policy making. Its relationship 
with regional producers has been determined by Turkey’s goal to be a transit country from Russia, 
the Middle East and the Caspian Sea to Europe. The aim has been twofold: (1) diversify energy 
suppliers in order to meet its own needs, and (2) increase the country’s relevance as a transit zone. 
However, over the years these efforts have been influenced by sets of focal issues and key drivers, 
leading to the evolution of different scenarios around Turkey as an energy hub in the region. 
3. Key	drivers	and	focal	issues:	territorial	conflicts	in	the	Black	Sea	
region	
The end of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new independent states in the Black Sea and 
Caspian region caused a radical shift in Ankara’s foreign policy. Turkey’s penetration into this 
region began with the offer of a free-market economy and cooperation on international energy 
projects. Ankara was important in guaranteeing access to Caspian energy sources as well in 
creating partnerships in the Black Sea basin in order to secure transport routes for the distribution 
of oil products to the West. However, the relationship between Turkey and Black Sea littoral 
countries has always developed along bilateral lines, rather than within multilateral formats. This 
is despite the fact that Ankara is a member of the BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation) and has 
participated in a number of initiatives within the Black Sea area. Indeed, Ankara’s foreign-policy 
concept has never included a vision or strategy in the Black Sea region. The official website of the 
Turkish Foreign Ministry does not even mention the Black Sea in its description of policy interests 
towards different regions. Moreover, under the section “Maritime issues”, the Black Sea basin is 
not even listed. This clearly hints at a lack of perception of the Black Sea as a region (Republic of 
Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017b). At the same time, it also indicates that Ankara has no 
interest in being a leading actor in any regional project or organization (e.g. BSEC or 
BLACKSEAFOR - the Black Sea Naval Co-operation Task Group). 
Consequently, Turkey has preferred to build relationships with both Ukraine and Georgia through 
bilateral formats rather than engaging with them in multilateral and regional fora. Ankara has 
always assumed that certain disputes on territorial issues and energy security were the main 
hindrance to a strategic partnership within the region. Indeed, the unresolved status of regional 
conflicts (Crimea, the Donbas region, Abkhazia and South Ossetia) in which Russia is seen as a 
supporter of secessionism have represented points of contention between Ankara and Moscow. 
Officially, Turkey supports the territorial integrity of Ukraine and Georgia, and does not recognize 
the annexation of Crimea by Russia or the de facto independence of Abkhazia or South Ossetia. 
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Moreover, Ankara supports the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of both Georgia and Ukraine. However, 
Turkey has adopted a cautious approach to the territorial conflicts in the region.  
Ankara defines its relationship with Ukraine as strategic, and Turkey is the second largest trade 
partner for Ukraine. The Ankara-Kiev partnership has been framed around security, economy and 
tourism. In particular, more than 280,000 Crimean Tatars living in Ukraine - predominantly in 
Crimea itself, now annexed by Russia - have been considered an important element in 
strengthening bilateral relations between the two. In the framework of humanitarian assistance, 
Ankara has financed a number of initiatives (worth more than US$25 million) related to housing 
projects in Crimea, and humanitarian assistance for IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) from the 
Donbas region. According to Turkey’s Foreign Ministry, Ankara and Kiev cooperate in several 
international and regional organizations, such as the UN, the Council of Europe, the OSCE 
(Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) and the BSEC. Furthermore, cooperation 
takes place in the military sphere on a bilateral basis and within the context of the NATO-Ukraine 
Commission, BLACKSEAFOR and Operation Blacksea Harmony (Republic of Turkey Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2017a). In 2017, Turkey and Ukraine signed off on a visa-free regime for their 
citizens in order to facilitate contacts and further enhance their relationship. Bilateral relations 
between Turkey and Georgia are similarly developed in the fields of economy, energy 
infrastructure and security. Visa requirements have also been mutually abolished. Turkey has 
been, and remains, Georgia’s single largest trade partner with a turnover worth more than $777.9 
million (Ajeganov, 2016). 
The current deepening Ukrainian crisis is placing Turkey in a difficult diplomatic position. At stake 
are Ankara’s commitments to its Western allies and its cultural kin, Crimean Tatars, against its 
economic and political relationship with Moscow. Ankara has remained passive with regard to 
defending the rights of the Muslim Turkic Tatars, who oppose the Russian annexation of Crimea. 
Furthermore, although Turkey has supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty in all 
official declarations, statements regarding Crimea have been made without mentioning Russia. In 
contrast to the EU, the US, Canada, Australia, Japan, Switzerland and Norway, Turkey did not apply 
any bilateral sanctions against Russia following its actions in Crimea. This certainly demonstrates 
how Turkey is avoiding confronting Russia. Indeed, Turkey always avoided making geopolitical 
choices between Russia and the transatlantic community when it came to Eastern Europe and the 
South Caucasus. During the 2008 Georgian-Russian war, Turkey tried to balance the West and the 
Kremlin by preventing NATO Mistral ships from entering the Black Sea basin, appealing to the 1935 
Montreux Convention, a document that limits the access of non-littoral powers into the Black Sea 
through the Turkish Straits. 
Political scientist Igor Torbakov has described Turkish-Russian relations as “political dualism”, 
stemming from their “competitive cooperation” in a number of areas including the energy field 
(discussed below) (Markedonov & Ulchenko, 2011).  As seen, among the diverging issues are also 
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territorial conflicts in the Black Sea region - namely, the Russian annexation of Crimea - war in 
Ukraine and Russian recognition of de facto Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
4. Key	drivers	and	focal	issues:	Turkey’s	dependence	on	Russia	
The energy cooperation between Russia and Turley goes back to 1997, when the two signed an 
intergovernmental agreement, for a 25-year period, on the construction of the Blue Stream 
pipeline guaranteeing 16 bcm of natural gas per year for Turkey. Due to the highly profitable trade 
relations between Turkey and Russia, Turkish businessmen lobbied in favour of the project. With 
this step, Turkey became the second largest importer of Russian gas after Germany. 
Today, Turkey buys around 55 percent of its natural gas and 12 percent of its oil from Russia 
(Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017c). Space heating and electricity production 
throughout the whole of Turkish territory is largely provided thanks to natural-gas imports from 
Russia. Around 42 million cubic metres (mcm) of Russian natural gas comes daily via Ukraine. In 
the case of an interruption, the Marmara region and Istanbul would face energy shortages, as the 
amount gas lost could not be substituted from elsewhere. And there is neither enough storage 
capacity for natural gas nor reserves for electricity generation to overcome a possible energy crisis. 
That is why ‘the risk of an energy shortage is such a major threat for Turkey that it could easily 
overshadow diplomatic manoeuvres’ (Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office, 2014). 
Additionally, Russia is Turkey’s second largest trading partner. The two countries claim that the 
growing trade volume between them is expected to triple, to some $100 billion, in the coming 
years (Cetingulec, 2016). The major Russian investments in Turkey go into the 
telecommunications, energy and tourism sectors. The activities of Turkish construction firms in 
Russia form another pillar of their economic relationship. Furthermore, Turkey and Russia are 
collaborating on the framework of BSEC, BLACKSEAFOR and Operation Black Sea Harmony. 
Moreover, in 2010 Ankara and Moscow signed an agreement on the construction of the Akkuyu 
Nuclear Power Plant. The Russian state-owned Rosatom has started to build Turkey’s first nuclear 
power plant in the port of Mersin. As Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan put it, the event 
marked the dawning of a “new era” in bilateral relations. And indeed, the Turkish-Russian nuclear-
energy partnership has further increased Turkey’s energy links with Russia. 
Finally, in 2012, Ankara granted Russia permission to construct the South Stream pipeline through 
Turkey’s Black Sea territorial waters. South Stream was supposed to bring some 63 bcm of Russian 
natural gas to Europe. In exchange, Ankara secured significant price concessions from Gazprom, 
as Moscow agreed to renegotiate long-term oil-indexed gas contracts. The decision to negotiate 
transit access for cheaper prices was, however, criticized by the EU. Turkey’s decision was 
perceived as a fundamental risk for the feasibility of the Southern Gas Corridor initiative (Koranyi 
& Sartori, 2013). However, the South Stream pipeline project has been abandoned, owing to 
controversy over non-compliance with European Union competition and energy legislation such 
as the Third Energy Package, and was subsequently replaced by TurkStream. 
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The realization of TurkStream was uncertain, as relations between Turkey and Russia worsened 
after a Russian Sukhoi Su-24 attack aircraft was downed over Syria by the Turkish Air Force in 
November 2015. Russia quickly introduced sanctions against Turkey, banning the import of 
Turkish fruit and vegetables, the sale of charter holidays for Russians to Turkey and construction 
projects with Turkish firms in Russia. The visa-free travel regime between the two countries was 
also suspended. However, in late June 2016, President Erdoğan apologized for the incident and 
bilateral relations improved. In July 2016, following a reconciliation meeting in Moscow, 
presidents Putin and Erdoğan signed a long-delayed deal to build the TurkStream pipeline.  
TurkStream 1 would essentially replace the 14 bcm-per-year Soviet-era Trans Balkan (TBL) 
Pipeline, which has been used since 2011 by private gas providers operating in Eastern Thrace and 
the Greater Istanbul area. TurkStream 1, whose onshore part will be co-owned by BOTAŞ and 
Gazprom, has an initial transit capacity of 15.75 bcm. The 900 kilometre offshore component, 
estimated to cost around $6.35 billion, will be entirely financed by Gazprom, the owner and sole 
operator of the pipeline. In conjunction with Blue Stream, which also has a capacity of 16 bcm to 
be expanded to 19 bcm/y, the Russian-owned and/or operated pipeline will be able to export to 
Turkey up to 35 bcm per year of Russian gas - equal to almost 83 percent of Turkish 2016 demand 
(estimated at 42 bcm). 
The completion by late 2019 of TurkStream’s first leg will eliminate Turkey’s transit dependence 
on Ukraine and secure lower gas prices for its Russian imports1 (Mikulska, 2017). As for the 
Moscow’s interests, the replacement of South Stream with TurkStream would serve Russia’s 
interests in securing its existing and future share in Turkey’s gas market, the fifth largest in OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) Europe, and its most important 
importer out of Former Soviet Union after Germany. It would also allow Russia to significantly limit 
its own transit dependence on Ukraine, although it is not clear if a second TurkStream pipeline will 
be constructed, especially before 2019, to reach Gazprom’s clients in the Balkans and southern 
Italy via Greece. TurkStream 2 would, however, definitely increase the geopolitical value of Turkey 
in Russia’s eyes and turn Turkey into a transit corridor of major importance for both Russia and 
the EU. 
Thus the TurkStream will commit Gazprom and BOTAŞ to another long-term contract, covering a 
maximum volume capacity of 15.75 bcm per year, close to one third of Turkey’s current demand. 
The existing long-term contract between the two state companies - which has, since 2005, been 
serviced through the Blue Stream pipeline - provides 16 bcm per year and is set to expire in 2025, 
although it has a ten-year renewal clause (Rzayeva, 2014: 22-23). 
Map 1 - TurkStream and Blue Stream Pipeline Routes (Vietnam Investment Review, 2016) 
                                                             
1 In 2016 Botas won a 10,25% discount by Gazprom, a policy that was discontinued for 2017. It is not 
inconceivable though that after the completion of the project new reductions may be negotiated. 
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Russia-Turkey gas pipeline plans. (AFP/Kun Tian) 
5. Key	drivers	and	focal	issues:	The	role	of	Turkey	and	Russia	in	the	
Southern	Gas	Corridor	
Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor Strategy is founded on the necessity to maximize imports of non-
Russian gas via non-Russia-controlled territory. The policy dates back to the mid-2000s, when the 
European Commission appointed, in September 2007, former Dutch Foreign Minister Jozias Van 
Aartsen as a special coordinator to promote the EU’s Southern Gas Corridor (Van Aartsen, 2009), 
and, in particular, the two projects of common interest put forward by several EU member states 
in the period between 2001 and 2005 - namely, the Nabucco (2005) and ITGI (2001) 
(Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy) projects. 
Initially, the policy was identified as part of the comprehensive TEN-E (Trans-European Energy) 
strategy, but it was elevated after the first Russian-Ukrainian crisis of 2005-6 to a special status as 
a core component of the 2008 EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan (Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions- Second Strategic Energy Review, 2008: 4-5). The 
policy’s strategic goal was to establish a fourth route of supply diversification after Russia, Norway 
and North Africa so as to limit the Union’s import dependence on Russian gas exports transited 
via Belarus and Ukraine. 
At the time, the European Commission recognized as potential sources of supply for the Southern 
Gas Corridor not only the Caspian Sea (i.e. Azerbaijan) and Central Asia (Uzbekistan; Kazakhstan; 
and, primarily, Turkmenistan) but also Middle Eastern gas from northern Iraq and Egypt, which 
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could reach the Turkish pipeline network via the then planned extension of the Trans Arabian Gas 
Pipeline system. 
The idea that the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) could be developed as a multi-sourced gas-supply 
route to the European Union tilted the European Commission in support of the larger2 Nabucco 
pipeline project, in which Turkey played a leading role both as an original member and a 
shareholder in the early consortium - which dated back to the Cooperation Agreement of October 
2002 - as well as the quintessential transit state for the entire Corridor, regardless of which project 
would be eventually selected. 
Turkey’s involvement in the Union’s evolving SGC was secured by dint of its geographical position 
as well as the considerable political and economic influence that Ankara could bring to bear vis-à-
vis Azerbaijan, whose decision would prove to be vital for the selection of the winning pipeline 
project. Baku, via its national oil company SOCAR, controlled, along with the Shah Deniz partners, 
the only readily available gas volumes that could be exported to Europe in ways that bypassed 
both Russian territory and Russian geostrategic influence. These volumes, estimated at 16 bcm 
per year, would come from the second phase of the development of the Shah Deniz gas field (SD2), 
in which the Turkish national oil and gas company TPAO was the second largest shareholder, with 
a 19 per cent stake.3 
Turkey’s aspirations moved beyond its evident role as an important transit state - especially after 
it negotiated, in October 2011, a unified transit-tariff regime for the entire length of the Nabucco 
project, extending from the Turkish-Georgian border to Baumgarten, Austria’s Central European 
Gas Hub. Turkey was already a major importer of Azeri gas from Phase 1 of the Shah Deniz field, 
consuming up to 6.6 bcm annually since 2007, and aspired to secure an additional 6 bcm per year 
from SD2 at privileged prices. 
Becoming an important transit country, through the construction of TANAP (the Trans-Anatolian 
Pipeline) and TAP (the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline), was not the only, or even the most important, 
priority for Turkey’s gas strategy vis-à-vis Europe’s SGC strategy and Ankara’s allies in 
Transcaucasia. For Turkey, Azeri gas exports would first and foremost diversify its own imports 
from Russia, and, as Gulmira Ryzayeva put it, “Turkey’s greater involvement would make Ankara 
more self-assertive in the regional political scene and increase its negotiating power vis-à-vis the 
EU and its accession talks which have fallen behind since Turkey became an EU candidate.” 
(Rzayeva & Tsakiris, 2012: 12). 
                                                             
2 Nabucco, as a 31 bcm/y capacity pipeline, was almost three times bigger in terms of transit capacity 
compared to the initial capacity of its competitors, namely the ITGI project (11 bcm/y) and the TAP project (10 
bcm/y). 
3 It is notable that TPAO controls an even bigger share of Shah Deniz (19%) than SOCAR which according to the 
terms of the existing Production Sharing Agreement has a share of 16,7%.	
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The link to Turkey’s accession talks (Tekin & Williams, 2009: 337-356) is also attested by several 
statements on the part of senior Turkish policymakers. As highlighted by Turkish Deputy 
Undersecretary for Energy and Natural Resources Yusuf Yazar, the “energy corridor” role has 
strengthened Turkey’s position in the accession period … In terms of European vital interests, the 
EU must shorten and ease the accession period to guarantee both the realization and operation 
of this “energy corridor”. In 2009 Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan even threatened 
to reconsider his country’s support for the Nabucco project, if the EU did not open the energy 
chapter in its accession talks with Turkey noting that “If we are faced with a situation where the 
energy chapter is blocked, we would of course review our position [on Nabucco].” Accordingly, 
former Turkish Minister of Energy Taner Yildiz even claimed that “with Nabucco, we believe we 
deserved [to be a member of] the EU” (Koranyi & Sartori, 2014; 32-33). 
Although the attempted linkage between Nabucco and Turkey’s accession talks failed to produce 
any significant progress for Turkey’s EU candidacy, Ankara’s attempts to ameliorate its own energy 
dependency through the increase of its imports diversification met with considerable success. 
Apart from the fact that Turkey controls, via the state-owned BOTAŞ corporation, a 30 percent 
stake in the TANAP pipeline (Socor, 2012), once SD2 is completed in 2020, it will be importing 
more gas from Azerbaijan - around 12.6 bcm per year - than the entire EU, which will get a total 
of 10 bcm per year via TAP4 (BP, 2013).  
By 2020, if Turkey’s gas demand remains at its current level of 42.5 bcm, Azeri gas exports would 
cover 28 percent of its final consumption, compared with the 55 percent of its demand that is (and 
will remain) covered by Russian exports. This is a considerable improvement in terms of Turkey’s 
import-diversification strategy, and one that will have a lasting effect given the long-term duration 
(25 years) of the Shah Deniz 2 contracts5 (BP, 2017). Azerbaijan would thus emerge as Turkey’s 
most important gas supplier second only to Russia, which will continue to dominate Turkey’s gas-
import portfolio well into the mid-to-late 2020s (and, most probably, beyond that, given the 
dynamic of the TurkStream 1 project and the existing long-term projects between Gazprom and 
BOTAŞ).  
The prolongation of Turkish dependence on Russian exports well into the next decade and a half 
is not only indicative of Gazprom’s competitive pricing. It is also a testament to the failure of the 
SGC strategy to operate as a multi-sourced supply “highway” and secure credible alternative 
                                                             
4 Of the 10 bcm/y which is the initial throughput capacity of TAP, 8 bcm/y will be transited via Greece and Albania 
to Italy purchased by Axpo Trading AG, Enel Trade SpA, E.ON Global Commodities SE, Gas Natural 
Aprovisionamientos SDG SA, GDF SUEZ S.A., Hera Trading srl and Shell Energy Europe Limited . 1 bcm/y will be 
consumed in Greece by DEPA Greek Pubic Gas Company S.A. and 1 bcm/y will be transited to Bulgaria for EAD 
Bulgargaz via the IGB (Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria). These data are based on the supply contracts signed 
between TAP and the offtakes in September 2013. 
5 For Turkey’s 2016 gas demand, p.29. For the share of Russian gas exports as a component of Turkish demand, 
p.29 and p.34.	
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exporters to Russia, other than Azerbaijan. Part of the reason for this shortcoming relates to the 
political upheaval provoked as a result of the so-called Arab Spring in 2011, which not only turned 
Egypt into a net gas importer as early as 2012 but also eliminated - due to the spillover of the 
Syrian civil war and the rise of Daesh/so-called Islamic State - any serious discussion regarding the 
construction of a gas pipeline between Turkey and the KRG (Kurdish Regional Government) that 
could feed into TANAP. The most significant blow to the EU’s SGC strategy, however, was the 
“loss” of Turkmenistan’s potential supplies and the self-elimination, up to 2015, of Iran as a 
potential supplier of the original Nabucco project. 
The inability - primarily due to US and EU diplomatic opposition - of Nabucco’s planners to secure 
gas supplies from Iran, so as to make their original plan viable to the Shah Deniz consortium, 
resulted in a major push on the part of the US and the European Commission that focused on the 
resolution of the Azeri-Turkmen maritime disputes in the Caspian Sea. The disputes included 
competing claims over the respective EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) limits of the two littoral 
states and the ownership of the Kyapaz/Serdar oil and gas field, which lies (Bohr, 2016: 86-88), 
literally, in the middle of the route of a potential Trans Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) that could 
easily cover the existing un-contracted capacity of the TANAP pipeline project - namely, 15 bcm 
per year.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 2 - Turkmen-Azeri Maritime Disputes (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2013: 2) 
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Turkey, which, contrary to US and EU policies, systematically championed during 2009-10 the idea 
of securing Iranian gas in order to make the Nabucco pipeline viable (see Tynan, 2009a; Tynan 
2009b; Tynan 2009c; Sariisik, 2009), endorsed the efforts of the European Commission to resolve 
the Kyapaz/Serdar dispute and construct the TCGP, but even the combined efforts of Ankara and 
Brussels could not overcome Russia’s strong opposition to the construction of TCGP in the absence 
of a comprehensive agreement regarding the status of the Caspian Sea. On 13 September 2011, a 
few days after the European Council authorized the Commission to officially promote the TCGP 
pipeline, Russia’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement that unapologetically condemned what it 
perceived as Europe’s “intervention” in the Caspian Sea. The statement noted Moscow’s 
“surprise” at the decision of the EU Council, underlining the fact that it “regretted the EU’s decision 
which by all appearances, ignores the current international, legal and geopolitical situation in the 
Caspian basin”. The Russian communiqué also warned that “all attempts to intervene in the 
Caspian deal could seriously complicate the situation in the region and negatively affect talks on 
the status of the Caspian Sea”(Azernews, 2011). 
The EU’s energy Commissioner at the time, Gunter Oettinger, did not mince his words when, 
noting, with notable un-diplomatic clarity during an interview with Deutsche Welle on 14 
September 2011, that Russia should not use its gas exports to politically pressure Europe and its 
Caspian partners: “if the Russians try to hinder Nabucco both technically, by constructing South 
Stream, and politically, by pressuring Ashgabat [the Turkmen capital] and Baku, I personally will 
have less confidence in numerous gas contracts with Russia and believe less that gas is not a 
political instrument for Russia” (1News.Az, 2011). 
Russia’s opposition to the SGC policy was in line with its strategic goal of blocking the formation 
of alternative export routes for the hydrocarbon resources of former Soviet Union states that 
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followed a pro-Western approach, aspired to become members of the Euro-Atlantic space 
(through membership of NATO and/or the EU), and opposed Russian attempts to reintegrate the 
post-Soviet space into a sphere of nearly exclusive Russian influence. Given the economic 
dependence of (especially) Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan on their hydrocarbon exports, if those 
states remained dependent on a Russian-controlled pipeline export system they would have 
limited means and/or incentives to oppose the re-establishment of Russia’s hegemony in their 
respective regions. In short, if, as former US Energy Minister Bill Richardson succinctly noted, the 
goal of US policy in the region was to press for “the construction of east-west oil and gas pipelines 
in Central Asia, securing political autonomy for the newly independent states of the former Soviet 
Union” (Richardson, 2005: xvii), then Russia’s goal was, and is, to do the exact opposite (Margelov, 
2002: 195-211). 
Although Russia might have been persuaded to tolerate a small-scale SGC project - the size, for 
instance, of TAP phase 1 - it would remain vehemently opposed to a larger and more disruptive 
project such as the original 31 bcm-per-year Nabucco project, especially if its construction 
involved the loss of its regional influence in the southern Caspian Sea. If Moscow had been 
opposed in principle to the concept of a SGC, then it could have used the opportunity of its August 
2008 conflict with Georgia as a pretext to physically damage or even cripple the Corridor’s vital 
infrastructure, which connects Baku to Erzurum via Tbilisi - namely, the Southern Gas Caucasus 
pipeline.  
Russia even preferred to lose its economic leverage over Turkmenistan to China, which 
underwrites its policy of diplomatic preeminence in Central Asia, but it could not accept 
Turkmenistan opening, in alliance with Azerbaijan, a route for the expansion of Western influence 
in Central Asia that could have also seriously competed with its share of the European gas markets. 
In the absence of Iran, the addition of Turkmenistan to the project would have rendered Nabucco 
viable, and would have at least tripled the net positive effect of the EU’s import diversification 
from the SGC area by 2020. Given the depth and breadth of China’s influence over Turkmenistan, 
and the continued frictions between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, this prospect remains quite 
questionable today. 
Turkey always sympathized with and supported the aspirations of the former Soviet republics of 
Central Eurasia, especially Azerbaijan, to chart an autonomous and often anti-Russian foreign 
policy. This was partly the reason it proved to be so instrumental in US/EU efforts to build the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline as well as the TANAP pipeline system, which was fundamental to  
the entire SGC strategy (Ediger & Durmaz, 2016: 131-149). Turkey also has no particular qualms 
about reinvigorating the prospects of securing either Turkmen or Iranian gas for the existing non-
contracted capacity of TANAP, estimated at 15 bcm per year - or, for that matter, the prospective 
construction of a second TANAP project - and has encouraged regional players, including 
Azerbaijan, to move in that direction after international sanctions on Iran were lifted following the 
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P5+1 nuclear agreement (i.e. that of China, France, Russia, the UK and the US plus Germany) with 
Tehran in late 2015 and 2016 (Tanchum, 2015: 55-65). 
Yet at the same time, Turkey would not be blinded to the fact that once the TCGP collapsed and 
Iran was cut off as a supplier from Nabucco, despite its sincere efforts to the contrary, the original 
idea behind the SGC would be downgraded to something far less ambitious and far less annoying 
to Russia. Turkey did not embrace the idea (often supported in EU circles) that the bypassing of 
Ukraine as a conduit for its Russian gas imports was mutually exclusive with its diversification of 
supplies through the implementation of the Southern Gas Corridor. This policy continues to guide 
Turkey’s energy diplomacy in its triangular relationship with Russia and the EU. 
6. Conclusions:	 the	Moscow-Ankara	 energy	 axis	 and	 the	 future	 of	
EU-Turkey	relations	
Turkish-Russian relations have always been a complex set of geopolitical “games”, in which energy 
issues have significantly decreased the possibility of a divergence between the countries. Energy, 
moreover, has transformed historical rivalry into an enhanced bilateral partnership. In its relations 
with Russia, Turkey has consistently put its economic interests before political strategies - and its 
private sector has played a very important role in strengthening this approach. 
Consequently, Ankara has remained passive, opting not to protest too much at the Kremlin’s 
assertive policies in the region and deciding to pursue its own political goals pragmatically. While 
Turkey generally supports Western positions in the region vis-à-vis the Ukraine crisis, it does not 
want to alienate itself from Moscow. Most likely, Turkey will continue to balance East and West, 
avoiding taking sides and calling for a peaceful solution of the crisis in Eastern Europe and the 
South Caucasus. 
Furthermore, Turkey will seize the greatest possible advantage by purchasing energy resources 
from all the main producers in the region. On the one hand, it will try to reduce its 
dependence - and possibly that of Europe - on Russian gas by embarking on the construction of 
the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and by paving the way for the realization of the Southern 
Gas Corridor (SGC). On the other hand, it will give Moscow the possibility of increasing its energy 
exports to the West through TurkStream, bypassing both Ukraine’s territory and the EU 
Commission’s competition rules (Schleifer, 2012). 
The benefits of TurkStream 1 for Turkey were so significant that the project “survived” the recent 
Russian-Turkish crisis over Syria, which threatened to derail the entire framework of cooperation 
between the two countries after Turkey downed a Russian Su-24 fighter in November 2015. It 
could be argued that the significance of the project acted inter alia as an impetus for President 
Erdoğan to mend fences with President Putin in June 2016, although this does not mean that 
Russian and Turkish geopolitical interests are now (or will become) fully aligned over the Syrian 
question (see Uysal, 2016; Khlebnikov, 2017). 
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Ankara opted for a far more balanced approach that simultaneously promoted both the 
TANAP/TAP (Trans-Adriatic Pipeline) and the South Stream and then the TurkStream gas pipelines, 
building on its own successful example regarding the Blue Stream project, which had already 
halved its own transit dependence on Ukraine before the EU devised its SGC strategy. Turkey has 
consistently upheld this parallel track, which delicately balances competing EU and Russian 
interests. Although South Stream was conceived as a bypass of Turkey, Ankara supported the 
project in order to keep its relationship with Russia intact, and in 2011 it granted South Stream 
developers the necessary permits to route the pipeline through its EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone). 
The lack of progress in Turkey’s EU accession talks regarding the opening of the Energy Chapter or 
the completion of the Trans European Network Chapter, in combination with the country’s non-
participation in the Energy Community, “exempts” Turkey from any European intervention over 
its sovereign energy-policy options - thus granting Ankara a high degree of diplomatic flexibility, 
which other EU member states do not have. This has also been translated into substantial 
cooperation with Russia. 
Energy ties between Ankara and Moscow are also expected to significantly influence the future of 
EU-Turkey relations in the light of the evolution of the EU-Russia energy partnership, 
which - despite periodic ups and downs - appears to be moving towards increasing mutual 
dependence. Indeed, notwithstanding the deterioration in relations following the eruption of the 
conflict in Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea by the Kremlin, energy interdependence 
between Europe and Russia continues to grow, while the diversification options put in place both 
by Brussels and Moscow do not seem sufficient to replace a significant part of the current 
exchanges. 
In this context, Russia’s attempt to circumvent Ukrainian territory not only from the north (via 
Nord Stream 2) but also by the southern route - although divisive within the EU - might eventually 
contribute to reinforcing this mutual dependence, in line with some compromise initiatives 
launched by the European Commission and Gazprom. With the realization of TurkStream, this new 
setting - free of potential interference from Washington - would contribute to increasing the direct 
role of Ankara in the energy triangle, and significantly impacting on the future of EU-Turkey 
relations. 
In this context, a cooperation scenario in the energy field becomes the most likely outcome for 
Turkey-EU relations: a scenario in which both Brussels and Ankara will try to coordinate their 
relations with Russia through a positive agenda, in order to exploit the interdependence emerging 
within the “triangle”. As analysed above, bilateral relations with Russia in the natural-gas sector 
will be central in cementing Turkey’s energy cooperation with the EU; indeed, in this domain 
Ankara will be able to exploit its strategic position, acting as a natural-gas crossroads (and, 
potentially, a hub) for southeastern European countries and Italy. 
This scenario also assumes that Turkey’s energy policy vis-à-vis the EU would not antagonize 
Russia, balancing the strategic interests of both Moscow and Brussels. In this framework, it will be 
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fundamental for Ankara to pursue (and to present to its European counterparts) the realization of 
TurkStream not only as an initiative to strengthen its partnership with Russia but also as an added 
value for Europe’s energy security. If understood by Brussels and the EU member states in 
southeastern Europe as a tool to avoid further transit disputes with Ukraine and to secure Russian 
supplies to their markets, TurkStream (and hence Turkey) may become an increasingly important 
variable in the European energy equation. 
A precondition for the emergence of this scenario is the undisputed commitment of Turkey to the 
realization of the Southern Gas Corridor, by supporting both TANAP and TAP, and possibly by 
allowing new gas molecules (i.e. northern Iraq) to transit through its infrastructure. Ankara’s full 
commitment will be pivotal for the implementation of the European Commission’s diversification 
strategy, and will definitively dismiss the idea that TurkStream and the Southern Gas Corridor are 
competing and mutually exclusive projects. 
The analysis carried out throughout this paper suggests that the convergence scenario in Turkey’s 
relations with the EU is far less likely, considering the current dynamics within the ‘energy 
triangle’. Indeed, in order to achieve this outcome both Ankara and Brussels need to adopt not 
only a more innovative approach in order to revitalize Turkey’s EU accession process but also a 
progressive alignment of their internal energy rules - especially in the gas domain. This would 
mean, specifically, the adoption and implementation by Ankara of the acquis communautaire (the 
EU’s body of accumulated legislation and regulations), with all the implications that this may have 
on the destiny of Russian gas supplies to Turkey. However, considering the current status of 
Turkey-Russia energy relations and Ankara’s reliance on Moscow’s hydrocarbons, full convergence 
on this issue appears unlikely. A more cautious and balanced approach by both Turkey and the EU 
in this context would indeed avoid direct confrontation with Russia, strengthening the current 
energy interdependence among the parties. 
The recent compromises achieved by the Commission and Moscow on competition and regulatory 
issues might contribute to slightly alter the picture.6 But, despite these efforts, which show the 
willingness of the parties to establish a fruitful dialogue on highly divisive energy issues, it is likely 
that Russia will do its best to prevent similar situations in a market - the Turkish one - in which it 
still retains strong commercial (and hence political) control. 
Furthermore, in a convergence scenario Turkey is expected to align its current policy on climate 
change with the ambitious one established by the EU. This would lead to the reduction of oil and 
coal (and, to a lesser extent, gas) imports from Russia, as they generate high levels of carbon 
                                                             
6 In March 2017, Brussels presented a draft agreement reached with Gazprom to end a two-year probe into the 
company’s alleged abuse of its dominant position in Central and Eastern Europe: the Russian giant, in fact, has 
proposed a number of commitments - which may become binding under Article 9 of the EU’s competition 
Regulation 1/2003 - that should guarantee competition in the regional gas sector.  In addition, back in 2016, the 
parties agreed on lifting the limits on Gazprom’s use of OPAL, the onshore pipeline linking Nord Stream to 
Germany, allowing Russia to pump more gas supplies to Europe while bypassing the traditional route via Ukraine. 
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emissions. In order to meet its electricity demand and fill the capacity gap generated by the 
suspension of coal-fired power plants, Turkey would be expected to increase its electricity 
production from renewable energy sources. Given the importance of Ankara for Moscow’s 
hydrocarbon exports, it is likely that Russia will use all the tools at its disposal (i.e. discounted 
prices) to keep its shares in the large and profitable Turkish energy market. 
Finally, as noted above, full convergence with the EU may envisage Turkey taking active measures 
to reduce its energy dependence (and that of Europe) on Russia, particularly by strengthening its 
supply-diversification strategy. However, given the current regional energy context and the 
difficulties of immediately procuring new gas resources for its market (e.g. from Turkmenistan, 
Iran or East Med), as well as the capacity of Russia to exploit its dominant market position in 
Turkey, it is difficult to imagine Ankara adopting a proactive diversification strategy that might 
alienate its stable energy-cooperation patterns with Moscow. In conclusion, although this scenario 
could enable Turkey to establish more strategic forms of energy cooperation with the countries 
of the Caspian Sea basin as well as the eastern Mediterranean region, thereby harmonizing 
Turkey’s regional energy policy with a wider policy of Westernization, the weight of 
Moscow-Ankara bilateral energy ties is likely to prevent such disruptive developments. 
The least likely outcome in Turkey’s relations with the EU is conflict. This scenario envisages the 
deepening of Turkey’s energy cooperation with Russia and the transformation of its existing 
energy dependence into a more comprehensive and strategic energy cooperation, to the 
detriment of Ankara’s energy partnership with the EU. This could potentially undermine European 
energy security and increase the joint capacity of Russia and Turkey to employ energy as a tool for 
influencing developments in the European Union. Under this scenario, Turkey could hamper the 
Southern Gas Corridor and limit the EU’s access to the energy resources of the Caspian Sea basin, 
and possibly of the East Med and Middle East. 
The conflict scenario could also lead to an increase in the Russian share of Turkey’s natural-gas 
market, transforming the current mutual dependence between the parties into an over-reliance 
of Ankara vis-à-vis Moscow. Despite Turkey’s recognition of the importance of a strong bilateral 
partnership with Russia, Turkish pragmatism would necessarily prevent the establishment of a 
mono-directional energy strategy and an almost exclusive dependence on Moscow for its energy 
supplies. In this context, energy cooperation with the EU cannot be completely dismissed by 
Turkey, as it would contribute towards balancing Russian dominance in its energy market (as well 
as its political leverage), and could be used by Ankara to establish/reinforce multilateral energy 
initiatives in its neighbourhood. 
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